It is always sad to see ships collide, break their backs, capsize, and sink, especially if they are so close to port. Here major media make a circus out of what is actually one of the saddest spectacles

The MSC Chitra / Khalija III collision outside Mumbai Harbour once again brings into focus the sheer neglect of maritime matters on the Indian coast by the various organisations responsible.

While details on what actually happened are still sketchy and the rumour mills as well as grapevines work overtime, with the media concentrating on the environmental damage aspect, here is what is known:-
 
The Khalija-III had already been in all sorts of problems with the Indian maritime administration. Why was she allowed to be anchored so close to the arrival and departure channels to and from the Bombay Floating Light Vessel area is still unknown? Yes, ships, especially those in trouble, try to get closer to the harbour-especially during the monsoon. But are we the world's safe haven for junks and rust-buckets just waiting to not just pollute our coast but also shut down our biggest ports? A cursory look will show a few dozen other such ships stuck in the Mumbai port-waiting to add to the list of derelicts and potential wrecks. Karachi Harbour was shut down for months a few years ago because of a similar incident.
 
The MSC Chitra belongs to one of the world's largest shipping companies-Mediterranean Shipping Company-based in Switzerland and with a very strong presence worldwide with cruise lines, container ships and other business interests. How they got there makes for another fascinating tale, one which involves many shades of grey, including some past escapades in the Bombay Port in the early '70s-when the company's owner was still a Master sailing his own ships in these waters. Their safety record is on par with the rest of them. But fact remains, huge container ships and monsoon winds as well as weather conditions require very high levels of ship-handling skills.
 
The MSC Chitra sailed out of the New Mumbai port, with over 2,000 TEU (Container capacity is often expressed in twenty-foot equivalent units, TEU) of containers loaded from this port, and a few thousand more already on board, and was on her way outbound. The current state of congestion at JNPT/Nhava makes for extremely fast turn-arounds, a "load as much as you can" status, with pressure to avoid any "shut-outs", all of which are recipes for disaster. Crew rest, load stability, actual contents as well as weight of containers and cargo - and other issues - are usually thrown to the winds in such conditions; the only parameter up for discussion is how much more can you load, how fast you can get this ship out, and the next one in. Typically, everybody onboard in such conditions would have been working non-stop for many hours before arrival, while in port, and when sailing out. That is 48-72 hours, easy-leaving them not at their brightest and freshest when sailing out.
 
There are a variety of inputs-but the most believable one has to do with this version-the outbound MSC Chitra in a hurry to make the monsoon impacted schedules simply sailed too close to the Khalija-III, and was then pushed by the prevailing winds on to her bows. Basic forces as studied in physics change of inertia and the rest of it did the rest. On cargo ships at sea, this is like a plastic ball full of liquid and marbles being pushed towards a sharp knife - one cut, and the marbles will all tumble out, while the plastic ball will collapse in all sorts of uncertain ways-and the water will behave in further multiple uncertain ways.
 
The various entities operational on VHF Radio in and around Mumbai/JNPT/Nhava/Butcher Island/Pir Pau/ONGC-Panvel and others have still not got their act together on common watch-keeping channels. As a result ships sailing in and out in the same waters using the same ocean channels are often keeping guard and keeping watch on different radio channels-sometimes not even aware of instructions being given to other ships right next to them. Please remember-ships do not have brakes-this business of not being able to coordinate VHF communication in and around Mumbai and its ports/terminals on different VHF radio channels has been going on for as long as this writer can remember-which goes back to the '70s.
 
It is always sad to see ships collide, break their backs, capsize, and sink, especially if they are so close to port. Here major media make a circus out of what is actually one of the saddest spectacles. Something like hanging around a hospital where thousands are cured every day, but the news is in covering the few cases that went bad, for whatever reason.
 
But the real trouble is just about to begin ashore. In commercial terms, this is probably one of the biggest disasters in the history of modern Indian shipping, and one that will have deep impacts on a large number of people. Bluntly put-many people are going to suffer-especially if their documentation after loading was not complete-and chances are that since this collision occurred within a few hours of the ship sailing, documentation was still "in process" for most. Which means many things-most of all, for shippers, it means they are now at the mercy of their agents, the shipping lines, and host of other intermediaries and entities. Many of whom will simply freeze documentation.
 
2000+ containers loaded from this port means, assuming a fair mix of full and part container loads (FCL and LCL), that there would be anything between 3000 and 6000 bills of lading which have suddenly come unstuck. That would also be anything between 15 and 25 thousand tonnes of cargo-these and other details will not emerge for some time, if at all, by which time truth will be the biggest casualty as a variety of interests race to protect themselves, as well as change the rules of the game by moving in all direction vis-à-vis things like insurance, freight, title, and other interesting aspects of trade nobody every worries about as long as things are going the way they should.
 
Therefore, here are some more true facts:-
 
1. Some of the documentation pertaining to cargo shipped on board this ship, especially if the documentation was still being completed, will soon not be worth the paper they are printed on. In commercial terms, issues like mate's receipts, shipped on board certificates, manifests and bills of lading will all be contested. Downstream there will be a move by a variety of entities to protect their interests, as cargo as well as freight deemed earned are both considered lost, without liability on the ship-owner, ship and cargo onboard soon to become part of the maritime ocean floor. Or come afloat on some beach somewhere, at some time - where it is of no value to the shipper or consignee. (Anecdote:- rubber ducks that were loaded in a container that went overboard in the Pacific Ocean during a storm landed up on beaches as far away as Kenya, Scotland, Bering, and the whole Pacific Coast area-for years.)
 
2. Understanding the fine print on "Total Constructive Loss" and "Salvors Rights" will take on deeper meanings, as shipper and consignee end up negotiating with more than just their bankers and insurers. Each case will have its own complications, and unless the terms and conditions of shipment have been fully understood as well as catered for, quite a few shippers will end up taking a big bath-even if they have negotiated their documents basis any of a variety of options. At the very least, the freight paid or not paid is lost-probably with some loaded add-ons-unless somebody remembered to insure the freight. At the other end, somebody will be left holding the damages on possible liability claims - the environment again, remember-again, so much will depend on the fine print in the insurance taken out before shipping the cargo.
 
3. There are shippers who insist on bills of lading directly from the primary shipping line concerned, even for the intermodal segments, as well as segments where the cargo may move on somebody else's ships. At the other end of the spectrum are the vast range of "shipping documents", whose antecedents are usually unknown, and hidden behind third country addresses-sometimes these are insisted on by consignees who seem to know more about the potential issues in such cases. In the middle somewhere are the Government of India authorised NVOCC (non-vessel owning common carrier) documents. This, again, is a very complicated subject and the outcome here will be simple-if the shipper/consignee negotiated only basis "rate", then there appears to be a problem.
 
4. As always, a few insurance frauds will surface-thereby putting a scrutiny on EVERY case pertaining to this incident. Insurance payouts at the best of times will take forever and a month-here it will be even longer. Invariably, containers which were nowhere near the ship and cargo which existed in dreams somewhere will get together and try to prove that they were on this ship. Happens all the time!
 
5. And finally, the worst downside is at the customer end-where shipments are part of somebody's Just in Time scheduling, or specific sub-components and assemblies. The Law of Torts or similar remedies simply do not apply in such cases, and where shipments contained important items whose basic value was far below the consequential losses caused by them not getting there, then there is no compensation.
 
Millions of containers move throughout the world seamlessly, like clockwork, keeping the wheels of commerce turning. The loss of MSC Chitra is like a massive cog thrown into a very smoothly operating machine, with results which are simply not known, and which will be hidden behind the louder noise of the environmental damage. Sad, but true-truth is always in the numbers, and this proves the case again.— Veeresh Malik